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Many of the questions raised in the cases discussed herein have been
passed upon several times before. This Article will serve as a discus-
Pion of the new and unique questions, which arose during the period
covered and also as a review of existing law commented upon.
I. SPECIF=C OFFENSES
A. Homicide
State v. Gozal was a first degree murder case in which the defense
was insanity. The court instructed on the defense of insanity and used
the standard test of whether the defendant knew right from wrong. De-
fendant offered, and the court refused, an instruction which would have
submitted the defense of insanity on the' theory that if the homicide
was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant, then he
was not guilty by reason of insanity. This theory had been approved in
New Hampshire2 and by a federal court.3 The court sustained a conviction
indicating that they would still follow the right-wrong test as was
originally set up in the M'Naughten case.4 This opinion contains an
excellent discussion of the various theories on insanity as a defense.
A second degree murder case5 pointed out that demonstrative evi-
dence submitted by the state in the form of a shirt and jacket worn by
deceased at the time of his death was not improper as the testimony
showed defendant was cutting at deceased and stabbed him on the left
side of the chest, and the hole in the shirt and jacket would have tended to
corroborate this evidence. There was no showing that the exhibits were
gruesome or that they were improperly displayed, waved, flourished,
or used for any purpose of inflaming the jury.
State v. Richardson0 was a second degree murder prosecution in
which the evidence showed that defendant fired a pistol and the bullet
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1958 and 1959 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Houston, Missouri; A.B., University of Missouri, 1952, LL.B., 1954.
1. 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1958).
2. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. 1954).
4. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
5. State v. Vincent, 321 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1959).
6. 321 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1959).
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hit another person than that intended by the defendant. The court
pointed out that the accident which might be used as a defense on behalf
of the defendant was the accidental firing of the gun, and not the acci-
dental course the bullet took. Also, the fact that the defendant did not
know and had no quarrel with, and did not shoot at the deceased was
not a defense since the constitutive elements essential to convict of mur-
der followed the bullet and were transferred to the actual victim when
they existed with respect to the intended victim.
Three manslaughter cases recently reviewed7 again point out that
in manslaughter cases involving culpable negligence the particular neg-
ligent conduct must be of such reckless character as to indicate an utter
indifference or disregard for human life. There must be more than or-
dinary common law negligence.
B. Robbery
State v. Hood8 involved a first degree robbery charge in which the
court set out an excellent discussion of the requirements for an informa-
tion in such a charge. Also the court ruled that the state could properly
cross-examine defense witnesses, who had admitted they were convicted
felons, with regard to the exact nature of the crimes for which they had
been convicted and the punishment assessed against them, inasmuch as
the witnesses were then inmates of the state penitentiary and that such
additional information with regard to their convictions and amount of
punishment were matters affecting their credibility as witnesses.
In another first degree robbery prosecution9 where defendant denied
participation in the robbery and challenged indentification from photo-
graphs shown to witnesses at police station as well as personal indentifica-
tion after being taken into custody, the photographs of defendant and an-
other participant which had been identified by witnesses at police head-
quarters were held to be admissible as evidence.
C. Burglary and Stealing
The opinion in State v. Pigques'° sets out in detail the elements of
burglary, particularly the breaking and the entry that are necessary to
7. State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959); State v. Mayabb, 316 S.W.2d
609 (Mo. 1958); State v. Duncan, 316 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1958).
8. 313 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1958).
9. State v. Childers, 313 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1958).
10. 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958), Faulkner, Criminal Law-Burglarv-Entrv
Defined, 24 Mo. L. REv. 371 (1959).
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constitute the offense. The evidence showed that the defendant broke
open an outer wooden door with the intent to steal chickens in a build-
ing; that he then became alarmed and ran away before he breached an
inner wire mesh door which barred his way to where the chickens were
located. The evidence further showed that there would be some force or
breaking necessary with regard to the wire mesh door before the
defendant could have actually gained an entrance to the place where
the chickens were located. The court held that the burglary had not
been accomplished. Therefore, the trial court was correct in submitting
the case on the basis of attempt to commit burglary.
In a prosecution for burglary and stealing1 the court held that it
was not error to permit testimony concerning the burglary of another
business establishment on the same night as the one involved in the
charge inasmuch as the evidence showed that both burglaries were ac-
complished on the same criminal excursion, the elements of each were
common to both, and the loot was co-mingled. Also the evidence showed
that there was a common scheme embracing two or more crimes so re-
lated to each other that the proof of one tended to establish the other.
In State v. Jacobs,12 a stealing prosecution, the jury brought in a
verdict of stealing without designating whether the property was of the
value of fifty dollars. The evidence was that the property involved'was
of the value of 3,350 dollars and the defendant's sole defense was that of
an alibi. The court held that the jury could lawfully reach only one of
two alternative decisions. The defendant was either guilty or not guilty
of stealing property of the value of 3,350 dollars and construed in the
light of the record the verdict is free of ambiguity and clearly reflects
that the jury found the defendant guilty of stealing the precise property
described in the information.
In another stealing case' s wherein the defendant's evidence was to
the effect that he was going to return or discontinue the use of the
property, the court held that it was error for the trial court to fail to
instruct on this defense under the statutory provisions 14 which provide
that if the property stolen is a chattel and the person charged with steal-
ing the chattel proves by a preponderance of the evidence no further
11. State v. Ronimous, 319 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1959).
12. 321 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1959).
13. State v. Gale, 322 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1959).
14. § 560.156, RSMo (Supp. 1957).
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transfer was made and that at the time of the appropriation he intended
merely to use the chattel and promptly to return or discontinue the use of
it, he has a defense to the prosecution. The court further pointed out that
it was neither desirable nor appropriate for them to embark upon a full
scale inquiry as to the scope, meaning, and effect of the new stealing
statutes,' 5 as such an inquiry was not necessary in this case, since a
necessary instruction was not given. Such an inquiry as to the scope,
meaning, and effect of these new stealing statutes seems to be needed but
to date there has not been a proper case before the court for it to consider
such scope, meaning and effect.
D. Arson
In State v. Paglino,16 defendant was convicted of homicide in perpe-
tration of arson. There had been a reversal of an earlier conviction on
the same charge17 because the state had failed to show incendiary origin.
In this case there was additional evidence presented by the state by
experts who stated that the fire was such as would be a fire of incendiary
origin, and also there was additional evidence in regard to the finding
of a gasoline can in defendant's car when he was apprehended. The court
pointed out that the prior ruling, that evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain conviction, was not the law of the case on the second trial where
there was new and material evidence introduced. Also, it was held that
whether opinion evidence as to the cause of a fire is admissible depends
upon whether facts and circumstances shown by the evidence are such
that a person of special skill, by reason of training or experience, would
be able to draw an inference from the facts established, where men of
common experience would be left in doubt or without reason to form
intelligently an opinion. Also, one expert testified that the fire was in-
cendiary in origin. The court held that while this admittedly meant that
it was set, such an opinion was not without factual support in the evi-
dence. All expert testimony, to a certain extent, invades the province of
the jury, because every opinion of an expert witness is an ultimate fact
in the sense that it is a conclusion based upon facts supported by the
evidence.
Another conviction for wilfully setting fire to and burning the house
15. §§ 560.156, 161, RSMo (Supp. 1957).
16. 319 S.W2d 613 (Mo. 1958).
17. State v. Paglino, 291 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. 1956).
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of another was reversed, 8 for the reason that there was not sufficient
evidence to establish the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in an arson
case is not merely the burning of property but that it was burned by
the wilful act of some person criminally responsibile for his acts and not
by natural or accidental causes.
State v. Varsalona'9 was a prosecution for arson wherein defendant
was charged with wilfully burning his own shop or warehouse. The court
held that the information in this case was insufficient in that it did not
charge that the life or property of another person was endangered, that
the burning was done with intent to injure or defraud any person, and
there was no charge of injury resulting to any person or thing as a re-
sult of this fire. The court pointed out that it was not the legislative in-
tent to provide that every person who wilfully burns his shop or store-
house shall be guilty of a felony unless it is further shown that such an
act endangered the life or property of others, defrauded or resulted
in injury to others. The statute providing that every person who wilfully
burns his shop or storehouse shall be guilty of a felony should be read
and construed in connection with and in light of other statutes pertain-
ing to arson.
In another arson prosecution,"0 defendant was convicted for burn-
ing insured goods with intent to defraud the insurer. The evidence
showed that the defendant had the opportunity to set the fire, that
there was the presence of motive, and that the defendant disclaimed, at
the time of the fire, having sufficient insurance to cover his loss suffered.
This made a sufficient case for the jury to consider. For those that are
particularly interested in the elements of a charge of arson, it is suggested
that you distinguish this case from State v. Ruckman.21
E. Obtaining Money by False Pretenses
State v. Gilpin22 was a prosecution for obtaining money by false
pretenses. In the trial evidence was admitted of a similar transaction
consummated a little more than a month before the offense here charged.
The court held that this was properly admitted and pointed out, as it has
18. State v. Paillou, 321 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1959).
19. 309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958), Wall, Crimina I Law-Missouri--Arson--Intent
Given to Statutory Requirements, 24 Mo. L. Rxv. 374 (1959).
20. State v. Ferrara, 320 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1958).
21. 253 Mo. 487, 161 S.W. 705 (1913).
22. 320 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1959).
19591
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often held, that in prosecutions for obtaining money or property by false
pretenses, evidence that defendant committed or attempted similar of-
fenses is admissible, if not too remote, in order to prove the criminal
intent of the accused. This is a well established exception to the general
rule that evidence as to other offenses is not admissible.
F. Buying and Receiving Stolen Property
Two cases involving prosecution for buying and receiving stolen
property23 point out that an essential element of the state's case under
section 560.270, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949) is that the defendant
be charged and evidence show that defendant received stolen property
with intent to defraud. These cases point out that an information which
alleged that defendant feloniously and fraudulently did receive said
goods was not sufficient. It was pointed out that the statute covering
this offense, prior to amendment in 1955, was a departure from the com-
mon law in that under the old statute intent to defraud was not a con-
stitutive element of the statutory offense. The court further pointed out
that the words feloniously and fraudulently did not sufficiently set out
the necessary allegation of intent. The intent alleged must be intent on
the part of the receiver of the stolen property.
G. Criminal Contempt
State v. Tope 24 involved a prosecution for contempt for refusal to
answer questions before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. In
approving the dismissal of the information the court held that the fact
that defendant declined to tell where she lived on the ground that if
she did so she might incriminate herself, did not result in making her
guilty of contempt. The immunity from self incrimination is available
before any tribunal in any proceeding.
H. Driving While Intoxicated
In a driving while intoxicated case,25 defendant claimed that the
verdict was unsupported by any evidence of felonious intent on the part
of the defendant. The court held that there was ample evidence that de-
fendant was driving the automobile involved, that he was at the time
intoxicated, and that under the statutory provisions proof of these two
elements is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
23. State v. Bryant, 319 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1959); State v. Harris, 313 S.W2d 664
(Mo. 1958).
24. 322 S.W.2d 160 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959).
25. State v. Spurlock, 312 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 24
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I. Misdemeanors
State v. Graham26 was a prosecution for exceeding a speed limit
wherein the principal evidence of the state was based upon the use of a
radar device. The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the various
cases that have been decided with regard to the reliability of a radar
device. The court held that radar as a device for detecting speed is
a scientific principle so soundly established as to be accepted by the
court. It was pointed out, however, that even though the court recognizes
the scientific principle as such, nevertheless there must be a showing that
the machine was properly tested and functional at the time and place of
the occurrence. In this case the evidence showed the radar was set up
a short time before the arrest, was checked by a State Patrol car
being driven through the radar beam at 50 miles per hour and 70 miles
per hour, the radar being compared with the recording of the patrol car
speedometer, and also was checked by the tuning fork test. The court
held that this was a sufficient showing of the reliability of the machine at
the time and place in question. It was also pointed out that the operator
of a radar machine could not be required to be familiar with all the
scientific principles involved in the working of the machine as long as the
operator was instructed as to the proper functioning and testing of the
machine for use.
In a prosecution for disturbing the peace in violation of a city or-
dinance,27 a judgment of conviction was reversed because the trial court
erred in denying defendant's request for a jury trial even though defend-
ant failed to appear at the trial. Also the court erred in trying the case
without the presence of defendant in court.
State v. Smith28 was a prosecution for operating a bawdy house in
which the court held that it was not error to permit witnesses to testify
that the house owned and occupied by the defendant had a bad reputa-
tion. This decision follows the general weight of authority that the rep-
utation of a house is admissible upon the issue as to whether it is a dis-
orderly house.
A judgment of conviction on the charge of wilfully and unlawfully
supplying intoxicating liquor, to-wit: beer, to boys under the age of
26. 322 S.W.2d 188 (Spr. Ct. App. 1959). See also Hough, Arrest in Missouri By
the Use of Radar Speedmeters, 24 Mo. L. Rlv. 196 (1959).
27. City of St. Louis v. Walker, 309 S.W.2d 671 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
28. 310 S.W.2d 21 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
1959]
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twenty-one years29 was reversed because there was not evidence to
establish that the beer which the boys were furnished contained alcohol
in excess of three and two-tenths percent and therefore there was no
evidence that the beer supplied to the boys was an intoxicating liquor.
State v. Pilkinton3 ° was a prosecution for a violation of the compul-
sory school attendance law, wherein the conviction was reversed on the
ground that there was not a sufficient information charging defendant
with this offense. The information set out the allegations with regard to
failure to keep the child in regular daily attendance in the public school
but contained no charge that defendant did not provide such child with
regular daily instruction at home substantially equivalent to instruction
given to children of like age at a day school. The court pointed out that
under the statutes with regard to this offense 3l the exceptions must be
pleaded in the indictment inasmuch as they are a part of the statutory
definition of the offense.
In a prosecution for operating an improperly licensed motor ve-
hicle,32 the court held that where a vehicle was the property of a Del-
aware corporation, which had only a statutory agent in that place, and
which had its principal place of business in Indiana where the vehicle
was based, garaged, repaired, and licensed, the corporation was a resi-
dent of Indiana within the meaning of the reciprocity statute referring
to registration of out of state vehicles. A corporation may have more than
one residence and the term residence must be defined according to the
situation in which it is used. In this case the determination of the defini-
tion of residence was based upon the reciprocity agreement involved
and the background and legislative intent with regard to the reciprocity
agreement. State v. Brunow3 3 was a similar case.
J. Habitual Criminal Act
In a prosecution where a defendant was convicted under the Habit-
ual Criminal Act,3 4 it was held that subsequent repeal of statutes under
which prior convictions of felonies were had was not material to issues
involved in prosecution under Habitual Criminal Act at this time, and
29. State v. Patton, 308 S.W2d 641 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
30. 310 S.W.2d 304 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
31. §§ 164.010-.110, RSMo 1949.
32. State v. Tustin, 322 S.W.2d 179 (Spr. Ct. App. 1959).
33. 320 S.W.2d 80 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
34. § 556.280, RSMo 1949.
[Vol. 24
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there is nothing within that act that requires that the statutes must still
be in force and effect when the second or subsequent offense is com-
mitted, and a prosecution instituted.35
State v. Nolan 6 was a prosecution for murder under the Habitual
Criminal Act wherein the defendant alleged error in permitting evidence
of prior convictions. His basis for this allegation was that defendant
served a sentence in the intermediate reformatory and not the peni-
tentiary. The court pointed out that since the offense for which he served
a term was punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the fact
that the defendant was sent to serve and did serve his term at the in-
termediate reformatory would not make the Habitual Criminal Act in-
applicable. Also the defendant claimed that the prior conviction was too
remote to be admitted in evidence, in that it occurred twenty-two years
before the instant charge. The opinion stated that since the Habitual
Criminal Act does not contain a maximum time limit, the remoteness
of a prior conviction would not affect the admissibility of evidence of
such prior convictions. The defendant further complained that such evi-
dence of prior convictions violated the right of privacy and was uncon-
stitutional. The Habitual Criminal Act has previously been found to be
constitutional and the court still had that opinion. Such evidence did
not violate the right of privacy inasmuch as the judicial disclosure that
a person has been convicted is privileged and communication of even
private matters does not violate privacy when the publication would be a
privileged communication under principles governing libel and slander.
In another prosecution involving the Habitual Criminal Act,3 7 the
state offered an exhibit in evidence which was a certified transcript of
defendant's record in the state penitentiary. In this exhibit there
was a list of the former imprisonments of the defendant, which in-
cluded imprisonments that were not pleaded in the information. The court
held that this was prejudicial error inasmuch as the mention of im-
prisonments that were not pleaded was inadmissible because not prop-
erly related to the cause on trial. The exhibit could properly have been
admitted, but its use should have been limited by excluding from the
jury the reference to the imprisonments that were not pleaded in the
information.
35. State v. Richardson, 315 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1958). See also a later affinmance
of the same case,.321 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1959).
36. 316 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1958).
37. State v. Dunn, 309 S.W2d 643 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
19591
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In a prosecution for molesting a minor, 8 the court held that where
evidence tends to show commission of impropriety with the prosecuting
witness at or about the same time and place that defendant committed
an indecent act with another boy, the act.with other boy formed a part of
the res gestae and the admission of evidence thereof was not improper.
The two acts were so inseparably connected and interrelated that evidence
of one necessarily tended to show the other. The two improprieties were
not independent but were concomitant. Also the defendant testified that
he had never committed the acts specifically charged with prosecuting
witness or with anyone else. The court held that it was proper rebuttal
evidence for the state to show that defendant had committed the same act
with the other boy earlier in the same year.
State v. Scown 39 involved a charge of abortion. There were several
questions raised with regard to cross-examination and the opinion con-
tains an excellent discussion of the scope of cross-examination of a
defendant. The state in cross-examining a defendant who has testified
in his own behalf is not confined to a categorical review of matters
covered or stated in the direct examination and may cover all matters
within the fair purview of direct examination.40 Generally evidence of a
different crime is inadmissible but where proof of other offenses may
tend to establish motive or intent, or absence of accident or mistake, or
identity of defendant, or a common scheme or plan embracing commis-
sion of separate similiar offenses so interrelated that proof of one tends
to establish the other, proof of such other offenses is usually held to be
admissible.
State v. Greer4l was a case in which defendant was convicted of
statutory rape of defendant's daughter. Error was claimed in the court's
permitting defendant's wife to testify on behalf of the state. The court re-
stricted the evidence of the wife to what she found when she returned
home and found defendant and the child together. The court upheld the
conviction, pointing out that the law of necessity alters the general rule
38. State v. Wilson, 320 S.W2d 525 (Mo. 1959).
39. 312 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1958).
40. See also State v. Brown, 312 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1958).
41. 313 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 24
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of competency under such circumstances, and the force and effect of the
common law decisions is such as to permit the husband and wife to testify
against each other on charges affecting their persons and liberties. The
opinion did not mention that there might be any distinction between the
husband and wife testifying against each other on charges affecting
their persons and on charges affecting their children, rather than them-
selves.
In State v. Hamilton,42 a prosecution on the charge of sodomy, the
state on cross-examination of the defendant asked questions which would
tend to impeach his credibility. After receiving unfavorable answers
to these questions the state offered and was allowed to present rebuttal
testimony to show defendant's answers to such questions were not true.
This rebuttal testimony was held to have been erroneously admitted in-
asmuch as the state was bound by the defendant's answers on matters
going to his credibility.
In the Daugherty case, the evidence showed that a blood test
was taken from defendant when he was not conscious. However, at
a later date defendant signed a waiver giving permission for the
authorities to examine his blood for its alcoholic content. The trial court,
out of the hearing of the jury, conducted an examination as to the
voluntariness of the defendant's waiver, determined that the same
was voluntary and ruled that the action of the defendant did constitute
a waiver of any complaint that the blood used for the test had been
extracted without his consent. The appellate court found that such action
was not erroneous.
In a prosecution for second degree murder,43 the evidence showed
that defendant threw the pistol used into the river after the shooting. The
court held that the use of a similar gun by an expert witness to explain its
operating mechanism as tending to meet defendant's testimony that he
accidentally fired the shots was not improper on the ground that it was
not the gun used by the defendant. It was pointed out that the objections
were not timely and further stated that such evidence was competent
under the record. It tended to meet the defendant's testimony.
B. Instructions
In State v. Butler,44 defendant was prosecuted for stealing. The
42. 310 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. 1958).
43. State v. Richardson, 321 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1959).
44. 309 S.W.2d 155 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
1959]
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question was raised as to the instruction given on the credibility of
witnesses, and the court held in view of the conflict in evidence the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in giving a credibility instruction with
a "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" clause attached. Even though such
instructions are often used, the court pointed out that they are received
more often with tolerance than with favor, and the giving of same is
largely within the discretion of the trial court. However, such an in-
struction should not be given where there is no conflict or basis for con-
flict in the evidence. Two other cases 45 discussed in some detail instruc-
tions as described above and pointed out that the same were subject to
criticism and were looked upon with disfavor, although as yet this alone
had not resulted in a reversal of any particular case.
In a prosecution for forcible rape,46 defendant objected to the fact
that some of the instructions given were on printed forms and others
were typewritten, which he alleged would tend to give undue emphasis
to the typewritten forms and to those instructions. The court held that
there was nothing wrong with presenting instructions in a printed form
and presenting other instructions in typewritten form.
State v. Andrews, 47 a prosecution for robbery, was a case where the
trial court gave two forms of verdict. One form was the standard verdict
form, the other informed the jury that if they agreed upon a verdict of
guilt but were unable to agree upon the punishment to be inflicted, the
court could assess the punishment. In answer to the complaint that these
were conflicting instructions, the court held that these two verdicts were
not conflicting and pointed out that the same were not even instructions,
but verdicts, contrary to the allegation of error alleging conflicting in-
structions.
In the Daugherty case, the evidence showed that the defendant
had been drinking at the time that the automobile accident occurred.
Defendant complained that the trial court did not instruct the jury
that defendant could not be convicted merely because he had been
drinking. The court held that the failure to so instruct was not error
inasmuch as the defendant did not make a request for such an instruc-
45. State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1958); (same defendant as Butler
case, supra note 44, but a different charge); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1958).
46. State v. Stehlin, 312 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1958).
47. 309 S.W.2d 626' (Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 24
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tion, and since this was a collateral matter, it was necessary for
the defendant to make such a request if he desired such an instruction.
C. Trial Procedure
In State v. Spurock,48 a felony case, the defendant complained that
he was not afforded a preliminary hearing before a qualified magistrate.
This question was raised for the first time in the unverified motion for
new trial, and no proof was offered to support the assignment of error.
The court held that if the defendant desired to raise the question he
should have filed a plea in abatement, and offered proof. By his action
of pleading to the information and going to trial he waived that question
and he cannot on appeal complain that he was not afford a preliminary
hearing.
In a prosecution for forcible rape,49 after conviction it was found
that one of the jurors was distantly related to the defendant. The trial
court refused to grant a new trial on this basis and the appellate court
held that such action was not error inasmuch as such relationship could
not be claimed to be prejudicial in view of the fact that the record did
not show that either the defendant or juror was aware of such relation-
ship until after the trial had concluded and, also, the defendant was pre-
sumptively helped by the relationship since it was his relative.
State v. Hampton" was a prosecution for stealing and burglary. The
record showed that the trial court had interrupted the jury after about
one hour's deliberation and at that time the jury informed the court that
they had agreed upon guilt of accused but were unable to agree upon
punishment. The trial court then instructed the jury that if they returned
a verdict which agreed upon guilt but were unable to agree upon punish-
ment the court could assess punishment, and thereafter the jury did re-
turn such a verdict and was polled in open court. Such action was not
error in receiving an incomplete verdict notwithstanding the fact that
the jury was not returned to the jury room for completion of its verdict.
The court is charged with the duty of assessing punishment when a jury
returns a verdict that is defective as to the punishment assessed and
the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury after they had said
that they could not agree on punishment; however, it was indicated that
48. 312 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1958).
49. State v. Chandler, 314 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1958).
50. 317 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1958).
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this is the best procedure. Also, the trial court was not obligated to have
the jury return to the jury room inasmuch as the statutes provide that
the jury can make its determination in the courtroom or retire to the
jury room.
State v. James51 was a prosecution for robbery in first degree. During
the course of the trial the trial judge directed 165 questions to the wit-
nesses with 163 of such questions occurring during examination of state's
witnesses. The court pointed out that the judge was within his power in
interrogating the witnesses, but that in this case he exceeded such
powers in the manner in which he used them. The judge's discretionary
power to interrogate witnesses is subject to certain limitations. Such ex-
tended interrogation by the trial judge as occurred in this case injected
the judge himself too much into the trial of the case, and therefore his
actions might have indicated to the jury a purpose to discredit the de-
fendant and his witnesses or the defendant's case. The court felt that the
trial judge was exhibiting a prosecutor's zeal inconsistent with the
aloofness which courts have again and again demanded of the trial judge.
He must not take the role of a partisan.
State v. Edwards52 involved a prosecution for unlawful possession
of heroin. Defendant complained that the trial court erred in refusing
to require a police officer to divulge the name of his informant whose tip
led to the arrest of defendant and discovery of narcotics hidden in de-
fendant's car. The trial court did not require that the name be divulged
although it did require that other information with regard to informant
be provided. In maldng this ruling the trial court expressly stated that
it was following the ruling in State v. Bailey,58 which held that a police
officer was not required to divulge the identity of an informant. The
opinion in the present case overruled the Bailey case by saying that
they did not believe any fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifi-
able. The question of whether there would be a disclosure of the identity of
a non-participating informant is to be determined essentially on whether
it is necessary for the fair determination of the issue in any given crimi-
nal case, and that is up to the discretion of the trial court. This privilege
of communication is a genuine privilege and must be based on the fun-
51. 321 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. 1959).
52. 317 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
53. 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928).
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damental principles of privilege. The privilege is well established and its
soundness cannot be questioned according to the court's opinion, but it
is subject to certain limitations and disclosure must be made when it is
relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused or is essential to a
fair determination of the cause. Therefore the case was reversed and
remanded because the trial court should exercise its discretion to de-
termine whether such a disclosure as requested should be made in this
case, and such discretion on the part of the trial court obviously was
not available prior to this decision because of the ruling in the Bailey
case. There was a strong dissent in this case in which the dissenting judge
indicated that the rule in the Bailey case evidences a sound public policy
vital to the protection of the public, and that the rule in the Bailey case
should be followed.
D. Motion to Vacate Judgment
In several cases 54 the appellate courts set out the scope of Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 27.26, which provides for motions to vacate judg-
ments. These cases indicate that a hearing on such a motion is not re-
quired if the files and records of the original proceeding disclose that
the prisoner is not entitled to such relief. Such a rule affords a prisoner
a convenient means for an attack upon a judgment that is void or other-
wise subject to collateral attack, but the rule does not broaden the right
of attack or scope of review beyond that permitted in habeas corpus
proceedings. Such a motion may not be used as a substitute for a motion
for new trial or function as an appeal.
State v. Warren,5 5 involving a motion to vacate judgment and sen-
tence, presented the unique objection that the defendant was denied due
process of law by reason of counsel being provided for defendant over his
protest, notwithstanding defendant's right to defend himself. The charge
involved was robbery, and the state waived the death penalty. The
defendant refused the service of the office of public defender and dis-
missed two court appointed attorneys, one of whom he had requested by
name. He stated he wanted to represent himself, and the trial court after
observing defendant came to the conclusion that defendant needed the
assistance of counsel, and provided defendant with counsel over defend-
ant's objection. The court pointed out that this was not a capital case
54. State v. Moody, 312 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. 1958); State v. Rutledge, 317 S.W.2d
365 (Mo. 1958); State v. Jarrett, 317 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1958).
55. 321 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1959).
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,ince the death penalty was waived; however, they stated that it
would seem to be the duty of the trial court to appoint counsel
for defendant in such a case, and therefore that defendant was not denied
due process of law. The court cited the case of Powell v. Alabama, 0
which held that in a capital case counsel should be appointed, even
though the same is not requested by defendant if defendant is unable
to employ counsel and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense. The court could see no readily apparent reason why the mini-
mum standard of due process of law should depend upon the permissible
punishment and they pointed out that the basic requirement for due
process of law is applicable to a non-capital case. Therefore counsel
should be appointed even though it is not a capital case if it is shown
that defendant is unable to employ counsel and is incapable of making
his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or
the like. This would seem to be some extension of the rule first estab-
lished in the Powell case.
I. APPFAL
It was very noticeable in the cases reviewed that many of the as-
signments of error relied upon by the appellants before the appellate
courts were not considered because they were not sufficient to comply
with the rules57 pertaining to motions for new trial, and preserved
nothing for review. Also many assignments were overruled because they
were so general and vague as to fail completely to preserve anything for
review. Also there were many allegations in the motions for new trial
for which there was no proof. Unverified allegations in criminal cases
do not prove themselves and cannot be considered unless substantiated
by the record.5 s
State v. Harris" involved a prosecution for possession of lottery
tickets, which was a misdemeanor. The St. Louis Court of Appeals trans-
ferred the case to the supreme court 0 for the reason that defendant had
properly raised and preserved a question involving construction of the
56. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
57. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 27.20.
58. State v. Whitaker, 312 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1958); State v. Ulrich, 316 S.W.2d
537 (Mo. 1958); State v. Tompkins, 312 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. 1958); State v. Stehlin,
supra note 47.
59. 321 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1959) (en bane).
60. 313 S.W2d 219 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
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constitution. The supreme court transferred the case back to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals on the ruling that the supreme court will not assume
jurisdiction on a constitutional question when the identical question has
been finally settled by prior decisions of the supreme court. The question
here was whether there was a lawful search and seizure and the basic
question to determine was whether there was a lawful arrest. If there was
a lawful arrest the search and seizure was lawful. The court pointed out
that the only question with regard to lawful or unlawful search and
seizure was whether or not there was a lawful arrest and this question was
not a constitutional question and therefore should be determined by the
court of appeals. It further pointed out that the supreme court had ruled
many times that if an arrest was unlawful then the search and seizure was
unlawful and that if there is a lawful arrest then the search and seizure is
lawful. Therefore, since this constituti6 nal question had been determined
many times they should not assume jurisdiction on an identical ques-
tion. This opinion would seem to be a restricted view as to the jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court on constitutional questions, as compared with
earlier cases. The court pointed out that insofar as the earlier cases
and others hold or may be construed to hold that this court has juris-
diction of any case in which an appellant has properly raised and pre-
served a question of violation of constitutional provisions relating to
unreasonable search and seizures, irrespective of and without reference
to the further decisive matter of whether the exact question involving
the construction of the constitution has been priorly adjudicated, should
no longer be followed. There was a dissent in this case indicating that
the prior cases should be followed and that the question was not only the
interpretation of constitutional provisions but also the application of
constitutional provisions.
State v. Morrow"1 was a prosecution for robbery. The defendant did
not file a notice of appeal until approximately two and one-half months
after judgment and sentence, there was no application for a special
order extending time for the filing of such a notice, and the period for
making application for such special order had expired. The court held
that they had no jurisdiction over the appeal and dismissed it for failure
to file a timely notice of appeal. The steps required after the filing of a
notice of appeal are not inherently jurisdictional but the filing of a
timely notice is a positive requirement of the validity of an appeal.
61. 316 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1958).
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